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By TYLERJ. GEE*
TYING ARRANGEMENTS OCCUR when a seller conditions the sale
of one product, the tying product, upon the sale of a second, the tied
product.' There are myriad examples where a seller might require the
purchase of a tied product as a condition for buying the tying prod-
uct-Microsoft Office for a Dell personal computer, Firestone tires for
a Ford sport utility vehicle, salt for salt-depositing machines, or even
ink for printers.
Antitrust laws protect competition and thereby consumers. When
coerced, tying arrangements limit consumer choices in the tied prod-
uct. The goal of policing tying arrangements is to protect the tied
product market. Concerns arise if the seller has the power to enforce
a tying arrangement. 2 Standard antitrust tying analysis requires a
showing of market power in the tying product market." This is be-
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1. See generally 1 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, PETER SULLIVAN & MAUREEN MCGUIRL,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 22.01 (2d ed. 2006) (defining tying arrange-
ments and outlining the competitive harm such arrangements impose). Services can also
be tied. See id.
2. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984). However, the Chicago
School of economic thought asserts that tying is not detrimental to competition in most
cases since you cannot get two monopolies for the price of one. See generally ROBERT BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Ward S. Bowman Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 21 (1957); Richard Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). But see Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through
Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985).
3. See generally I VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.02. The other require-
ments are: there must be two separate products or services, the sale of one of the products
must be conditioned on the purchase of the other product, and a "not insubstantial"
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cause tying arrangements theoretically do not present a problem if
there is no market power in the tying product market. A buyer who
does not want to buy the tied product has the option to purchase the
tying product from the seller's competitors.
Arrangements that the seller has the power to enforce raise an-
ticompetitive concerns because they are potentially harmful to compe-
tition on the merits and innovation in the tied product market.4 In
these cases, there is potential for the seller to inhibit competition on
the merits in the tied product market.5 Anticompetitive concerns in
the tied market are particularly acute in requirements ties, where the
seller conditions the sale of the tying product on the condition that
the buyer purchase all tied products from the seller in the future.6
For sixty years, the courts applied a presumption that a patent on
the tying product created a presumption of market power sufficient to
force a consumer to buy a tied product.7 An antitrust defendant could
rebut the market power presumption by showing lack of market
power or, in other words, availability of reasonable substitutes. The
rationale was based on a patent's presumed uniqueness.
In Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink,8 the United States Su-
preme Court removed the rebuttable presumption that a patented ty-
ing product conferred the market power sufficient to enforce a tying
arrangement.9 After Independent Ink, tying arrangements involving in-
tellectual property rights are treated in the same manner as tying ar-
rangements that do not involve an intellectual property right. The
Court declared that a government-granted intellectual property right
in the tying product does not warrant a presumption of market
power.10
amount of commerce in the market for the tied product is foreclosed. Id. This Note fo-
cuses on per se illegality of ties, though a tie can also be unlawful under the rule of reason
if the elements of the per se rule are not met. See id. § 22.03 (discussing tying arrangements
under the rule of reason).
4. See id. § 22.01.
5. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14.
6. See generally Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281,
at 5-7 (2006) (No. 04-1329) (discussing requirements ties and contrasting to a tying ar-
rangement where the tied sale is contemporaneous to the tying product sale).
7. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
8. 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006).
9. Id. at 1293.
10. Id.
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This Note argues that, in deciding Independent Ink, the Court was
overbroad in its characterization of the market power presumption,
and the Court's analysis neglected important policies justifying the
United States patent system. In failing to narrowly focus its analysis on
the subset of patents used to enforce patent tying arrangements, the
Court based its decision on the wrong pool of patents. Also, the Court
was overbroad when it relied on standard antitrust tying cases not in-
volving intellectual property without reconciling specific concerns
that arise with patent ties. Addressing the strength of the market
power presumption would be more responsive to the concerns of anti-
trust and patent law. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Court
made no inquiry into patent law's incentive justification I and the po-
tential for harm to innovation and competition on the merits in the
tied product market.
Part I of this Note enumerates the elements of a per se tying viola-
tion of antitrust law, details the background of the market power pre-
sumption in patent tying cases, and explains the underlying policies of
patent law. Part II outlines the Independent Ink decision, the parties to
the action, and the parties' contentions. Part III offers a critical analy-
sis of the Court's reasoning, suggests more appropriate concerns that
the Court overlooked, and attempts to offer insight into the practical
effects of the now-abandoned presumption. While the effects may be
nominal at the micro level, abandoning the presumption represents a
shift favoring patent holders and increasing their reward. At the
macro level, to the extent that patent holders are insulated from at-
tack due to the difficulties and costs plaintiffs face without the pre-
sumption, patent holders will be able to impose more harmful and
coercive patent ties.
I. Background: Conflict at the Intersection of Antitrust and
Patent Law
Courts have struggled to find principles capable of unifying two
potentially conflicting bodies of law-antitrust and patent.12 Patent
law grants a limited right to exclude others, with the objective of en-
couraging innovation, 13 while antitrust law attempts to curtail im-
proper uses of market power, with the objective of promoting
11. The incentive theory posits that innovation will increase if innovators are given
the right to exclude others.
12. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REv.
1813 (1984).
13. 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST, § 1.1, at 1-2 (2006).
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competition. 14 These objectives sometimes clash. There are three ba-
sic forms of claims that patent rights are abused where patent law and
antitrust clash: (1) antitrust claims for affirmative relief, (2) defenses
to claims of infringement by the patent holder, i.e., patent misuse,
and (3) defenses to breach of contract involving a license of a pat-
ent.' 5 The outcome in each situation depends on some balance be-
tween the policies of antitrust law and patent law. To understand the
difference in outcome between each of these different forms, this sec-
tion outlines the basic policies of patent law, the elements of an anti-
trust tying violation, the origins of the market power presumption in
patent misuse, and the relationship between patent misuse and
antitrust.
A. Basic Patent Policy: The Incentive Justification
The justification for the patent system rests largely on the classical
economic incentive theory: the idea that granting property rights for
inventions incentivizes further innovation. 16 The Constitution refer-
ences the incentive theory directly, stating that the rationale of the
patent system is "[t] o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 17 The underlying
policies of patent law can be illustrated with a simple contract analogy:
the patent is a contract between the inventor and the government; the
inventor, in consideration for a limited right to exclude others, 18 dis-
closes to the government and the public how to make and use a novel,
useful, and nonobvious invention.' 9
Patent law seeks to enforce the bargain so that the inventor pro-
duces his or her consideration by way of various requirements that
14. Id. § 1.2, at 1-5.
15. See Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 406 (2003).
16. See U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
17. Id.
18. Some refer to this as a limited "monopoly," but this terminology is inconsistent
with how "monopoly" is defined in the antitrust context. See generally 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 13, § 4.2a, 4-8, 4-9 (2006). In the antitrust context, monopoly is defined as the
ability to raise prices or restrict output. Id. at 4-9. A patent, however, only gives the patent
holder the right to exclude others from practicing the invention. Id.
19. See DONALD S. CHISUM, CRAIG ALLEN NARD, HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PAULINE NEW-
MAN & F. ScoTT KIEFF, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 3 (3d ed. 2004).
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must be met before a patent is granted. 20 The patent holder receives
the benefit of the bargain by negotiating licenses with competitors or
suing for infringement. 2' Assuming the patent has some value, the
price of the end product or service will be greater than the competi-
tive price of the product absent the intellectual property right.
From a purely economic standpoint, this is undesirable-less out-
put is produced and consumers are charged a higher price.22 Overall,
there is a shift of consumer surplus to the patent holder. 23 That is,
because the seller is able to charge a higher price to those who are
willing to pay more, consumers pay more than they otherwise would
have. 24 There is also a deadweight loss since, as a result of the higher
price charged, some consumers who would have bought at the com-
petitive price will no longer buy.25 However, from the incentive theory
standpoint, the transfer of wealth and the deadweight loss are the
price paid for incentivizing innovation. 26 If the value of innovation
does not compensate society's loss, the incentive structure has failed.
Therefore, patent policy also seeks to ensure that the patentee does
not take too much by extending his or her right to exclude beyond
the scope of the claims or duration of the term. Allowing such exten-
sion would place uncompensated costs on society.
B. Antitrust Tying Requirements
The goal of condemning harmful tying arrangements is to pro-
tect competition on the merits and innovation in the tied product
market.2 7 Generally, for a tie to violate the antitrust laws per se, four
requirements must be met: (1) there are two separate products or ser-
vices; (2) the sale of one of the products is conditioned on the
purchase of the other product; (3) the seller has sufficient market
power for the tying product to enable it to restrain trade in the market
20. Id. The enablement, disclosure, and best mode requirements, to name a few, must
all be fulfilled in order for the government to grant a patent. See generally DONALD S.
CHISUM, I CHISUM ON PATENTS (2006).
21. Of course, not all patents are valuable enough to license or litigate, but Professor
Scherer found that litigation is the most significant factor in determining the value and
market power of a patent. See Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 5-8, I11. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
22. See generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMIcs, 354-55
(4th ed. 1998).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 1.2, at 1-10.
27. See I VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.01.
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for the tied product; and (4) a "not insubstantial" amount of com-
merce in the market for the tied product is foreclosed. 28
To meet the first requirement, the plaintiff must prove that there
are two distinct products or services. 29 Whether the tying and the tied
products are separate products turns on consumer demand.30 If there
is demand for each product in absence of the other, then the prod-
ucts are separate.3' However, if there is not consumer demand for the
products separately, and if there is only demand for a tied package,
then the products together are considered one product.3 2
To fulfill the second requirement, the plaintiff must show that
the seller conditioned the sale of the tying product on the agreement
to buy the tied product.3 3 The focus of this element is on the seller's
ability to force the consumer to purchase something that he or she
would not purchase in a competitive market.3 4 If the buyer is free to
purchase the products separately at a reasonable price, then the forc-
ing requirement is not met.3 5
Third, the seller must command market power in the tying prod-
uct market. 36 To determine if the seller meets this standard, the in-
quiry is "whether the seller has the power, within the market for the
tying product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept bur-
densome terms that could not be exacted in a completely competitive
market."37' The Supreme Court focused on three guidelines for deter-
mining whether a defendant-seller has sufficient market power: (1)
defendant's market share is sufficient to force buyers to purchase the
tied product; (2) high acceptance rate of the tying arrangement; and
(3) uniqueness of the tying product.3 8
Fourth, proof of effect on the tied product market requires that
the tie affects a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce.39
28. Id. § 22.02.
29. See id. § 22.02(2) (a).
30. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21 (1984); see generally 1 VON KALI-
NOwSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.02(2) (a).
31. See 1 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.02(2) (a).
32. See id.
33. See id. § 22.02(3)(a).
34. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.
35. See I VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.02(4) (a).
36. See id.
37. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Former Enters., Inc. (Fortner I1), 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977).
38. See 1 VON KALINOWSKI ET AL., supra note 1, § 22.02(4)(b).
39. See id. § 22.02(5).
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The Supreme Court interpreted a "not insubstantial" amount as any-
thing more than a de minimis amount. 40
C. Patent Tying's Presumption of Market Power: Origins in Patent
Misuse
The presumption of market power is derived from the doctrine
of patent misuse.4' The justifications for the misuse doctrine are
grounded in patent policy; misuse is a limit on the government-
granted right to exclude others from making, selling, or using the pat-
ented subject matter in the United States. 42 Misuse focuses on the pat-
entee's attempt to extend the scope of the patent grant or the
duration of the grant.4 3
The Supreme Court first announced the doctrine of patent mis-
use in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.,44 in
which the patent holder sold a patented film projector mechanism on
the condition that all the film used in conjunction with the film pro-
jector would be bought from the patentee. 45 The patent holder sued
on a contributory infringement theory.46 The Court held that the pat-
entee misused the patent by extending the scope and duration of the
limited right to exclude. The scope was improperly extended to in-
clude unpatented film, and the duration was improperly extended to
40. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969).
41. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2(e), at 4-13 through 4-14; see also Ken-
neth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: "Blessed Be the Tie?)" 4 HAgv. J. L. &
TECH. 1, 31-35 (1991) (explaining in detail the development of the antitrust
presumption).
42. See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.1.
43. See id. § 3.2b.
44. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). While the Motion Picture Patents Co. case overruled Henry v.
A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912), and Congress passed Section Three of the Clayton Act be-
tween the two Supreme Court cases, the Motion Picture Patents Co. case did not rely directly
on antitrust law. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 518-19.
45. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 503.
46. Id. at 505. There are two categories of infringement: direct and indirect infringe-
ment. Direct infringement occurs where the alleged infringer practices all of the claim
limitations set forth by the patent; indirect infringement occurs when one party either
contributes to a third party's direct infringement or induces a third party's direct infringe-
ment. Professor Chisum offers the following definition of contributory infringement: "The
seller is liable as a contributory infringer if he knows that the component is 'especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent' and if the compo-
nent is 'not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfring-
ing use."' CHISUM, supra note 20, § 17.01 (quoting from 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000)).
Accordingly, proving indirect infringement by one party necessarily requires proving that
there is an underlying direct infringer.
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require the purchase of film after the patent expired.47 The Court's
reasoning rested solely on patent policy.48
In Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,49 the Court explicitly ex-
tended the patent misuse defense to direct infringers. In Morton Salt,
the manufacturer of a patented salt tablet dispensing system sued an-
other manufacturer for infringement.50 The defendant argued that,
because the patent holder conditioned the sale of its patented salt
dispensing machines on the sale of unpatented salt, the patent holder
committed misuse.51 The Court focused on the "adverse effect upon
the public interest of a successful infringement suit, in conjunction
with the patentee's course of conduct, which disqualifies him to main-
tain the suit, regardless of whether the particular defendant has suf-
fered from the misuse of the patent. '5 2 The Court found that the tie
constituted misuse. 53
Nearly the same facts appeared in International Salt Co. v. United
States,54 five years later, in the context of an affirmative antitrust suit.55
In International Salt, the United States alleged International Salt vio-
lated Section One of the Sherman Act by tying the sale of salt to the
purchase of its patented salt-dispensing machine. 56 Without examin-
ing market power, the Court held that "patents confer no right to
restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt. By contracting to close
this market for salt against competition, International has engaged in
a restraint of trade for which its patents afford no immunity from the
antitrust laws." 57 This was the first appearance of a market power pre-
sumption in antitrust.58
In 1962, United States v. Loew's Inc.5 9 solidified the presumption of
market power in antitrust cases involving intellectual property tying.
Loezw's involved tying less popular movies to more popular, copy-
47. See Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 518.
48. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.2a, at 3-4.
49. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
50. See id. at 490-491.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 494.
53. See id.
54. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 393-94.
57. Id. at 395-96.
58. See id. While the Court did not announce a presumption as such, the Court relied
on earlier decisions holding that "it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from
any substantial market" without examining market power. Id. at 396 (internal citations
omitted); see also Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 36-37.
59. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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righted movies.60 The Court held: "The requisite economic power is
presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted, [citing
International Salt] .... The patentee is protected as to his invention,
but may not use his patent rights to exact tribute for other articles."'6'
The presumption of market power in patent tying antitrust cases
is the result of the "cross-fertilization" between patent and antitrust
doctrine that culminated with International Salt and Loew's.6 2 The Su-
preme Court supported this presumption as recently as 1984 in Jeffer-
son Parish Hospital v. Hyde 6 3 in which it held:
[I]f the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar mo-
nopoly over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy
the product elsewhere gives the seller market power. Any effort to
enlarge the scope of the patent monopoly by using the market
power it confers to restrain competition in the market for a second
product will undermine competition on the merits in that second
market. Thus, the sale or lease of a patented item on condition
that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied product
from the patentee is unlawful. 6 4
In sum, the early patent misuse cases condemned tying arrange-
ments without inquiry into market power of the patented tying prod-
uct.65 Taken together, International Salt and Loew's imported misuse
reasoning and announced the presumption in the antitrust context. 66
The presumption was reaffirmed in Jefferson Parish.67 Until Independent
Ink was decided, the presumption remained undisturbed.68
60. See id. at 40.
61. Id. at 45-46 (internal citations omitted).
62. Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 35.
63. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
64. Id. at 16 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens wrote the five-member majority opin-
ion. However, Justice O'Connor's concurrence created uncertainty in the Court's support
of a market power presumption. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 52-55 (explaining Justice
O'Connor's concurrence). She wrote: "A common misconception has been that a patent
or copyright, a high market share, or a unique product that competitors are not able to
offer suffices to demonstrate market power." Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37
n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
65. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
66. Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (1947); Loew's, 371 U.S. at
45-46 (internal citations omitted).
67. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35.
68. Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006).
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D. Convergence of Patent Misuse and Antitrust
Gradually, many of the misuse concerns were addressed by anti-
trust analysis. 69 Some commentators advocated for abandoning mis-
use and replacing it with antitrust principles. These commentators
argued that antitrust principles were not fully developed when the pat-
ent misuse doctrine was conceived and that these antitrust principles
address the same concerns as patent misuse. 70 However, some com-
mentators believed patent misuse aimed to remedy two wrongs: an-
ticompetitive use of the patent and expansion of the patent grant.7 1
While antitrust law aims to remedy the anticompetitive use of the pat-
ent, it does not address all the harm that patent policy addresses. 72
A second reason for the convergence is that statutory restrictions
on patent misuse have substantially limited the doctrine. 73 The Patent
Act of 1952 (the "1952 Act")7 4 and the Patent Misuse Reform Act of
198875 placed significant restrictions on lawsuits concerning patent-
tying arrangements. 76 In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress mentioned
patent misuse for the first time. 77 Rather than codify the doctrine, 78
Congress merely limited misuse by providing the patent holder with a
right to sue for contributory infringement.79 Similarly, Congress
69. See generally Feldman, supra note 15; RobertJ. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the
Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (2001); 1 HOVENKAMP ET
AL., supra note 13, § 3.2.
70. For example, Judge Posner supports the elimination of patent misuse in favor of
using antitrust principles to analyze tying arrangements. See USM Corp. v. SPS Techs, Inc.,
694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982). Professor Hovenkamp notes that the "modern view of
some courts and commentators [is] that effect on competition is the only legitimate con-
cern of patent misuse doctrine." 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.2b, at 3-8.1
through 3-9; see also Mark A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of Patent Misuse
Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. Rev. 1599 (1990); Note: Is the Patent Misuse Doctrine Obsolete?, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 1922 (1997).
71. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 3.2b, 3.2c, at 3-7, 3-8.1.
72. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 400; see also Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current
Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V, 793-94 (1988).
73. See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.3c, at 3-37.
74. 82 ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
75. Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4674.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000).
77. Id. The 1952 additions are reflected in § 271 (d) (1)-(3), and the 1988 additions
are reflected in § 271(d)(4)-(5). See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.3c, at 3-37.
78. Then-student, now-Professor Lemley referred to this as "inverse codification"
since the common law doctrine is not codified but some of the limitations are. Lemley,
supra note 70, at 1610; see also I HOVENKA MP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.2a, at 3-5.
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1)-(3). This was the congressional response to Mercoid
Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944). See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 13, § 3.2a, at 3-5. Mercoid held that the patent holder misused its patent covering a
heating system when it sued the manufacturer of a combustion switch that was an integral
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passed the Patent Misuse Reform Act in 1988, which exempted a pat-
ent holder from misuse in the absence of market power.8 11 While not
conceding the existence of a market power presumption, some com-
mentators argue that this change in patent misuse eliminates any pre-
sumption in patent antitrust.8 ' However, the bill as originally drafted
explicitly included a provision that would have eliminated any market
power presumption in an antitrust case.8 2 The failed Intellectual Prop-
erty Antitrust Protection Act stated:
In any action in which the conduct of an owner, licensor, licensee,
or other holder of an intellectual property right is alleged to be in
violation of the antitrust laws in connection with the marketing or
distribution of a product or service protected by such a right, such
right shall not be presumed to define a market or to establish mar-
ket power, including economic power and product uniqueness or
distinctiveness, or monopoly power.83
Bills similar to the Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act
have been proposed, and all have failed.8 4 Accordingly, it is unclear
what Congress intended: on the one hand, Congress explicitly re-
moved the provision eliminating the market power presumption in
antitrust; on the other hand, it is arguably inconsistent to require mar-
ket power in the misuse defense but not in an affirmative antitrust
action.8 5 To take the latter position seemingly ignores the compro-
mise reached in the House when it rejected the Senate version.8 6
Lastly, patent misuse and antitrust have converged since the mis-
use defense has lost its former bite. The Federal Circuit, created pri-
part of the invention and had no substantial non-infringing use. Id. § 3.2a, at 3-5. The 1952
Act overturned this portion of the Mercoid holding. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (1)-(3).
80. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (5).
81. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 4.2el, 4.2e6, at 13-14, 35-36.
[T]he statute itself does not explicitly apply to antitrust actions. Nevertheless, it
would be anomalous to require independent proof of power in patent misuse
cases, which have historically assessed lesser requirements, while permitting
power to be inferred in antitrust challenges to patent ties. It would also be irra-
tional for Congress to immunize patent ties from Patent Act liability only to have
them condemned under the Sherman or Clayton Act under the very same
circumstances.
Id.
82. S. 438, 100th Cong. § 102 (1988).
83. Id.
84. See H.R. 401, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2674, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 298, 101st
Cong. (1990); S. 270, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 469, 101st Cong. (1989). All proposed a
similar form of the Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act.
85. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 21.3f4, at 21-46 through 2146.1.
86. See Richard Calkins, Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175,
196 (1989); Feldman, supra note 15, at 431.
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marily to enforce the patent codes, has been extremely hostile to the
defense. The Federal Circuit has introduced new requirements and
generally limited its findings of misuse to conduct that also violated
the antitrust laws. 87 Only one Federal Circuit case has produced a
finding of misuse.88
E. Important Distinctions Between Misuse Tying and Antitrust
Tying
There are important procedural and remedial distinctions be-
tween antitrust tying and patent misuse.89 First, patent tying in the
antitrust context is an affirmative cause of action, a procedural
sword. 90 In contrast, patent misuse is a shield and can only be used in
defense to a claim of infringement.91 Second, a patentee who violates
antitrust laws with an improper tying arrangement is subject to treble
damages. 92 As misuse is only a defense, no damages are available
against the patent holder when misuse is successfully argued to de-
fend against a claim of infringement. 93 Third, the standing required
for patent misuse differs from the standing required to bring an anti-
trust claim.94 Any party that has been sued for patent infringement
has standing to raise the patent misuse defense, while antitrust causes
of action require a showing of antitrust injury.9 5 Further, in patent
misuse, no nexus between the patentee's misuse and the harm caused
by the misuse is required; in other words, there are no injury or causa-
tion requirements. 9 6
Notwithstanding the above mentioned argument advocating for a
one-to-one replacement of patent misuse with standard antitrust anal-
ysis, courts have not adopted a wholesale replacement. 97 Some com-
mentators assert that misuse is directed to remedy harms insufficiently
87. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.2a, 3-6; see generally Hoerner, supra note
69.
88. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
89. See generally Lemley, supra note 70, at 1611-13.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1608-1609; see also I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.6b, at -60.1.
92. See Lemley, supra note 70, at 1607.
93. 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.6b, at 3-60.1.
94. See Lemley, supra note 70, at 1612; see also 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 3.6c at 3-62.
95. See Lemley, supra note 70, at 1612.
96. See id. at 1612-13.
97. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("The
concept of patent misuse arose to restrain practices that did not in themselves violate any
law, but that drew anticompetitive strength from the patent right, and thus were deemed
to be contrary to public policy. The policy purpose was to prevent a patentee from using
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addressed by antitrust law and that antitrust law cannot capture the
range of harm to which patent misuse is directed.98 Professor Feld-
man stated: "In short, if we use antitrust to test for patent misuse, we
may be blind to significant concerns under patent policy." 99 The non-
competitive harms that the patent system creates, which are inade-
quately addressed by standard antitrust tying analysis, include: dupli-
cative research activity, defensive research activity to block
competitors, misallocation of talents, and disincentives for the next
generation of inventions. 100 Limits on the scope and duration of pat-
ent rights are designed to limit some of the systemic costs to society,
listed above, that the patent grant imposes. 10'
H. The Case: Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink
A. The Parties
Petitioners to the United States Supreme Court were Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. and Trident, Inc., a subsidiary of Illinois Tool Works ("Illi-
nois Tool Works"). 10 2 Illinois Tool Works manufactures printheads
for use in printing barcodes on corrugated paper, which is ink-inten-
sive and requires transferring large amounts of ink from an ink
container to the printhead. 10 3 The printheads and container are cov-
ered by Illinois Tool Works's patent. 10 4 The standard form licensing
agreement allows printer manufacturers to use the patent so long as
they purchase ink exclusively from Illinois Tool Works. Moreover, the
the patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which inheres in the statutory patent
right.").
98. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 431.
99. Id. at 401.
100. Id. at 434-35. Duplicative activity is a non-competitive harm that antitrust law does
not detect; it occurs when parties waste resources by trying to design around rather than
improving on a patent. See id. This creates disincentives for the next generation of inven-
tions. See id. Also, the patent system encourages defensive research activity aimed at block-
ing competitors. See id. Often, defensive research activity results in an invention no better
than the original. See id. The patent system can misallocate talents since more emphasis will
be placed on developing patentable inventions. See id.
101. See id. at 436.
102. II. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284 (2006).
103. Id. at 1284-1285; Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
104. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1284. Before Illinois Tool Works acquired Trident, Trident
owned the patents in question. Trident did not manufacture the technology covered by the
patent; rather, it only manufactured ink and licensed the technology subject to the ink
restriction. See Craig McLaughlin, Monopoly Power of Patents and Antitrust Law Collide in Pat-
ent Tying: A Presumption of Market Power Should Arise from Forcing Consumer to Purchase an
Unpatented Good as a Condition of Using a Patented Good, 48 ORANCEI COUNTY LAw. 38, 40
(2006).
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agreement precludes end-consumers from refilling the container with
other ink. 1 0
5
Respondent was Independent Ink, a manufacturer of printer ink
that can be utilized in the patented printheads.10 6 Fearing an infringe-
ment suit, Independent Ink brought suit against Illinois Tools Works
for antitrust violations and a declaratory judgment of non-infringe-
ment and invalidity.10 7
Respondent was supported by the American Antitrust Institute,10 8
several professors,10 9 an association of printer remanufactures, 0 and
various states as amici.11l However, numerically, Petitioner had the
overwhelming support from amici, including the United States gov-
ernment,112 various intellectual property law associations,' 13 industry
groups, 114 and the American Bar Association." 15
105. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1285; Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1345.
106. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1285.
107. Id. at 1285. Illinois Tool Works had previously brought a patent infringement ac-
tion against Independent Ink, but that suit was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Id.
108. Brief of Amici Curiae American Antitrust Institute, American Library Association,
American Association of Law Libraries, Association of Research Libraries, Special Libraries
Association, Certified Automotive Parts Association, Computer & Communications Indus-
try Association, Automotive Parts Remanufacturers Association, Production Engine
Remanufacturers Association, Service Station Dealers of America & Allied Trades, Tire In-
dustry Association, and ValueClick, Inc. in Support of Respondent, 111. Tool Works v. In-
dep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
109. Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, I11.
Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329); Brief of Professors Barry
Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, and Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ill.
Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
110. Brief of Amici Curiae of International Imaging Technology Council and
Remanufacturing Industries Council in Support of Respondent, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep.
Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
111. Brief of the District of Columbia and the State of California and the States of
Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ill. Tool
Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
112. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Ill. Tool
Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
113. Brief Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association in Support of the
Petitioners, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329); Brief of
New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329); Brief of the Houston
Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Ill. Tool
Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329); Brief Amicus Curiae of the
Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago in Support of Petitioners, Ill. Tool Works
v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
114. Brief for Verizon Communications as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Ill.
Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329); Motion for Leave to File
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B. Procedural History
1. United States District Court, Central District of California
In August 1998, Independent Ink filed suit against Illinois Tool
Works seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity,
and illegal tying in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.' 16
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
on the Section One Sherman Act claim and denied plaintiffs cross-
motion for summary judgment.' 17 The district court held that there is
no presumption that a patent confers market power, and since Inde-
pendent Ink offered no direct evidence of market power, Illinois Tool
Works was entitled to summary judgment. "8 In rejecting the market
power presumption, the district court relied on Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Jefferson Parish,'19 various circuit courts of appeals deci-
sions, and commentators' criticisms of the presumption while dis-
missing several Supreme Court cases as "vintage" precedents. 120
Finally, the district court held that, even if there was a presumption of
market power, the defendants successfully rebutted the presumption
by offering testimony that the printhead system had at least two
competitors. 21
2. The Federal Circuit Decision
On appeal, the three-judge panel reversed the district court deci-
sion.122 The panel examined the history of tying arrangement cases
and Supreme Court precedent. Relying on a long history of tying
Amici Curiae Brief and Brief for the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., the Ass'n
of American Publishers, the American Society of Media Photographers, Inc., the Business
Software Alliance, the Entertainment Software Association, the Independent Film & Televi-
sion Alliance, the National Football League, and the Recording Industry Association of
America, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct.
1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
115. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
I11. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
116. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Trident, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
This suit was actually brought against Trident, Inc., a company later acquired by Illinois
Tool Works in the course of the litigation. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc.,
396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
117. Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1173.
118. Id. at 1163, 1165-67.
119. Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
120. See Indep. Ink, 210 F. Supp. 2d at 1163-64. For example, Fortner II, Loew's, and
International Salt were all dismissed in a footnote by the district court. See id. at 1165 n.10.
121. See id. at 1166-67.
122. See Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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cases, the panel held that the Supreme Court "squarely establish [ed]
that patent and copyright tying, unlike other tying cases, do not re-
quire an affirmative demonstration of market power.' 123 The panel
grudgingly rejected Illinois Tool Works's arguments that International
Salt and Loew's were no longer good law. 124
First, the panel rejected reliance on a "nose-counting" argu-
ment. 125 According to this argument, a "then-majority" of the Court
would have rejected the presumption because Justice O'Connor's Jef-
ferson Parish concurrence clearly rejected it and, two years later, Jus-
tices White and Blackmun, both members of the Jefferson Parish
majority, dissented from denial of certiorari in Data General indicating
that they now disapproved of the presumption.1 26 The district court
endorsed the reasoning that a then-majority of the Supreme Court
believed International Salt and Loew's were no longer good law.' 27 The
panel rejected this reasoning and held that speculation about Justice
O'Connor's Jefferson Parish concurrence and a dissent from denial of
certiorari in Data General hardly repudiates the long-standing pre-
sumption of market power. 128
Second, Illinois Tool Works relied on numerous academic arti-
cles that criticize the presumption of market power. 129 The panel held
that the "fundamental error in all of the defendants' arguments is that
they ignore the fact that it is the duty of a court of appeals to follow
the precedents of the Supreme Court until the Court itself chooses to
expressly overrule them."1 30 The panel went on to express doubt as to
the wisdom of the Supreme Court precedent-referring to possible
"infirmities" and "wobbly, moth-eaten foundations" of the market
power presumption-but declined to abandon the presumption in
the absence of a congressional mandate or ruling by the Supreme
Court.13
The panel then turned to the scope of the presumption and held
that "a patent presumptively defines the relevant market as the nation-
123. Id. at 1348.
124. See id. at 1349-51.
125. Id. at 1350.
126. See id. at 1350 (referring to Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37 n.7 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring)); Data General Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473 U.S. 908 (1985) (cert. denied)
(White, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
127. See Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1350.
128. See id.
129. See id. For an example of such criticism, see 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13,
§ 4.2.
130. Indep. Ink, 396 F.3d at 1351.
131. Id.
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wide market for the patented product itself, and creates a presump-
tion of power within this market." 132 The presumption is rebuttable,
but the panel held that the "mere presence of competing substitutes
for the tying product" is not sufficient to rebut the presumption. 133
The panel indicated that a full-blown market analysis is required to
rebut the presumption.134 The court reversed and remanded the case
to allow Illinois Tool Works to supplement the summary judgment
record with evidence to rebut the presumption.'3 5 The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari.1 36
C. The Parties' Contentions
1. Illinois Tool Works' Contentions
Petitioner, Illinois Tool Works, argued that the presumption that
patents confer market power had never been examined in accordance
with modern antitrust principles.1 37 It contended that the origins of
the presumption are in patent misuse, which never inquired or ex-
plained why market power was unnecessary to establish an illegal
tie. 138 Illinois Tool Works argued that, as a product of the patent mis-
use doctrine, based on a judicial interpretation of patent policy, this
presumption was improperly transplanted into antitrust law without
analysis of antitrust principles.1 39 Illinois Tool Works asserted that
proof of market power is required under modern antitrust jurispru-
dence to effectively screen out procompetitive ties. 140
Next, Illinois Tool Works disputed whether the market power
requisite to antitrust claims should be presumed from a patent in the
tying product. 141 Since empirical data suggests that a large percentage
of patents produce little or no economic value, Illinois Tool Works
argued that there should be no presumption of market power.142 Fur-
132. Id. at 1352.
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 1352-53. The district court's grant of summary judgment to the defen-
dant on the Section Two Sherman Act claim was affirmed and is not relevant to the ques-
tion presented before the Supreme Court. See id.
136. Il. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2937 (2005) (granting cert.).
137. Brief for the Petitioners at 15, 111. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006)
(No. 04-1329).
138. Id. at 16.
139. Id. at 19.
140. Id. at 21.
141. Id. at 23.
142. Id. at 25.
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ther, since many patents are incremental improvements, there is no
basis for assuming there are no close substitutes. 43
Illinois Tool Works also argued that the presumption penalizes
procompetitive behavior, encourages unjustified litigation, and tends
to have a chilling effect on innovation. 144 With the presumption, an
antitrust defendant must conduct an expensive economic analysis to
meet the bar of rebuttal set by the Federal Circuit.' 45 Illinois Tool
Works argued that the rebuttable nature of the presumption is not an
effective screen against meritless litigation. 46
Finally, Illinois Tool Works pointed out that the weight of aca-
demic criticism favors abrogating the presumption, that the federal
antitrust enforcement agencies no longer follow the presumption,
and that the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 eliminated the pre-
sumption in antitrust as well as in misuse. 147 In sum, Illinois Tool
Works petitioned the Court to remove the presumption of market
power when the tying product is patented.
2. Independent Ink's Contentions
Respondent, Independent Ink, argued that the longstanding pre-
sumption of market power structures the burden of proof in a fair and
efficient manner.148 To support this argument, Independent Ink fo-
cused on the narrow pool of patents to which the presumption at-
taches. 149 Patents involved in tying litigation are more likely to have
value and confer market power.150 Illinois Tool Works's assertion that
most patents are valueless is directed to all patents generally; however,
the appropriate class of patents, those patents used to enforce a tying
arrangement, are likely to confer market power. 51 Independent Ink
argued that shifting the burden of producing evidence regarding mar-
ket power to the defendant is fair because the patent holder is in the
143. Id. at 25-26.
144. Id. at 27-30.
145. Id. at 32-33. Recall, the Federal Circuit held that "[t]he presumption can only be
rebutted by expert testimony or other credible economic evidence of the cross-elasticity of
demand, the area of effective competition, or other evidence of lack of market power."
Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
146. See Brief for Petitioners at 32 n.10, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281
(2006) (No. 04-1329).
147. Id. at 37-39.
148. Brief for Respondent at 20, Il1. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006)
(No. 04-1329).
149. Id. at 21.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 29-30.
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best position to determine whether the patent in question has market
power and may justify any procompetitive benefits for the tie.I52 The
burden can be rebutted by producing evidence that the patented
product has close, non-infringing substitutes.1 53
Independent Ink argued that if the presumption causes meritless
litigation, deters innovation, and punishes procompetitive conduct,
Petitioners could offer examples of these occurrences in the years fol-
lowing International Salt and Loezw's. 1 54 Independent Ink asserted that
the presumption had not generated meritless litigation because there
are other screens built into antitrust law to protect innovation and
procompetitive conduct, which deter meritless litigation.155 Lastly, In-
dependent Ink urged the court to rely on the principles of stare deci-
sis-arguing that Petitioners must meet a very high burden for the
Court to overturn a precedent that had been followed for over fifty
years.1 56
D. The Court's Reasoning
Justice Stevens 157 delivered the opinion of the Court; all members
of the Court joined except Justice Alito.' 58 The Court held that the
presumption of market power in the tying product market cannot be
presumed in antitrust law, given its "demise" in the patent misuse con-
text. 159 Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit was vacated and remanded to the district court to allow
Independent Ink to develop and to introduce evidence on the issue of
market power. 160
152. Id. at 32.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 36.
155. Id. at 10.
156. Id. at 13-19.
157. An interesting tidbit for the legal historian: now-Justice Stevens was a law clerk for
the late-Justice Wiley Rutledge in 1947 when International Salt was decided. Justice Rutledge
voted in the majority, creating the presumption of market power. See Tony Mauro, Ruling
Weakens Competitors'Ability to Sue Patent Holders, RECORDER, Mar. 2, 2006, at 2. Justice Stevens
also wrote the Jefferson Parish majority opinion, which affirmed the market power presump-
tion in dicta. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
158. Illinois Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006). The Supreme Court
heard oral arguments in this case before Justice Alito was confirmed by the Senate and
sworn-in; therefore, he did not hear oral arguments in the case. See id. at 1293. Justice
O'Connor, while present at the oral argument, took no part in the Court's decision. See id.;
see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-8, 23, Il. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct.
1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
159. Indep. Ink. 126 S. Ct. at 1284.
160. See id. at 1293.
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The Court granted certiorari to allow for a "fresh examination" of
the judicial and legislative developments since the 1947 International
Salt decision that were relevant to the consideration of tying arrange-
ments. 161 The Court first traced the history of tying arrangements. 162
It examined the 1912 case, Henry v. A.B. Dick Co.,' 63 which condoned a
licensing agreement for a patented printing machine that contained a
condition that the machine only be used with ink made by A.B.
Dick. 164 In dissent, Justice White voiced his concern about tying ar-
rangements and their potential use to extend the patent grant. 165
Congress agreed with Justice White and passed Section Three of the
Clayton Act in 1914,166 which specifically disapproved tying arrange-
ments involving a patented tying product when competition would be
lessened. 167 The Court noted in Independent Ink that tying arrange-
ments were strongly disapproved after the passage of the Clayton
Act. 168 As evidence of this strong disapproval, the Court cited lan-
guage from several historic precedents stating that tying arrangements
"serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition"' 69
and "generally serve no legitimate business purpose."1 70
As time passed, the Court noted that this strong disapproval of
tying arrangements had "substantially diminished" and that proof of
market power in the tying product is generally required.' 7 1 In Fortner
I, the four dissenting justices agreed that tying can, in fact, serve a
161. See id. at 1285.
162. See id.
163. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
164. See id. at 25-26; see also Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1286 (explaining the Henry v. A.B.
Dick holding).
165. Henry, 224 U.S. at 49 (White, J., dissenting).
166. Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 14
(2000)).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to lease or make a sale or contract for sale
of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities,
whether patented or unpatented,... on the condition, agreement or understand-
ing that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect [is to] . . . substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.
Id.
168. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1286.
169. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)).
170. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1287 (citing Former Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp. (Fort-
ner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1969)).
171. Id. at 1286.
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procompetitive purpose. 172 The justices in Fortner II adopted the dis-
senting view of Fortner I-that tying can be procompetitive. 17  Finally,
the Court noted the Jefferson Parish holding that "per se condemna-
tion-condemnation without inquiry into actual market conditions-
is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable."'7 4
However, after citing Jefferson Parish, the Court had to reconcile
the strong dicta stating that "the sale or lease of a patented item on
[a] condition that the buyer make all his purchases of a separate tied
product from the patentee is unlawful."'1 75 The Court explained that
this statement did not support a presumption of market power when-
ever the tying product was patented; rather, it established a narrower
rule-when a contract conditions the purchase of an unpatented tied
good on the sale of a patented tying product, there is an illegal tie. 1
76
To further minimize the significance of the language quoted from Jef-
ferson Parish above, the Court noted that there was strong disagree-
ment as to whether a patent conferred market power, as illustrated in
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Jefferson Parish.177 It is this
"vestige of the Court's historical distrust of tying arrangements" that
was at issue in Independent Ink.178
The Court acknowledged that Justice O'Connor correctly real-
ized that the presumption of market power had its origins in patent
misuse1 79 and eventually "migrated" into antitrust law in International
Salt.1 80 However, since the analysis in International Salt did not men-
tion patent misuse or market power, the Court examined the Govern-
ment's brief in International Salt to extract the rationales relied upon
in that case.18 1 In International Salt, an antitrust case, the Government
argued that the tying arrangement imposed was identical to the tying
arrangement in Morton Salt, a patent misuse case. 18 2 The Court did
not inquire into market power in Morton Salt, and it relied on the fact
that the tying product was patented. 8 3 Arguing by analogy, the Gov-
172. See id. at 1287 (citing Fortner , 394 U.S. at 510).
173. Id. at 1287 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. Former Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S.
610, 622 (1977)).
174. Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 2, 15 (1984).
175. Id. at 16.
176. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1288.
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. See id. (referring to Justice O'Connor's Jefferson Parish concurrence).
180. Id. at 1289.
181. See id.
182. See id. (citing the Government's brief in Int'l Salt).
183. See I HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.3bl, at 3-14.
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ernment urged "that the earlier patent misuse cases supported the
broader proposition 'that this type of restraint is unlawful on its face
under the Sherman Act. ' 1 84 Based on this examination of the Gov-
ernment's brief and the International Salt holding, the Court con-
cluded that it "necessarily accepted" the Government's invitation to
import the market power presumption into the antitrust context,
since it applied the narrower misuse rule to the broader antitrust
law. 185
However, the Court reasoned that subsequent events in patent
law and antitrust led to the "untwining" of the two doctrines. 18 6 The
Court found the Patent Misuse Reform Act of 1988 particularly signifi-
cant to the untwining.1 87 Since Congress eliminated the market power
presumption in the patent misuse context, the Court believed it would
be "absurd" to conclude that Congress supported the continued exis-
tence of the presumption in the generally more stringent realm of
antitrust when patent misuse is an equitable defense and antitrust is
punishable by federal incarceration. 18 8 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that tying arrangements in which the tying good is patented
should be evaluated under the Fortner II and Jefferson Parish line of
cases-which require proof of market power-rather than the reason-
ing employed by Morton Salt and Loew's.189
The Court then addressed two other grounds that Independent
Ink advanced for maintaining a narrower presumption. 190 First, the
Court rejected Independent Ink's argument for a rebuttable presump-
tion of market power due to the presence of a requirements tie since
184. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1289 (quoting the Government's brief).
185. See id.
Our opinion in International Salt clearly shows that we accepted the Government's
invitation to import the presumption of market power in a patented product into
our antitrust jurisprudence. While we cited Marton Salt only for the narrower pro-
position that the defendant's patents did not confer any right to restrain competi-
tion in unpatented salt or afford the defendant any immunity from the antitrust
laws, [citing International Salt], given the fact that the defendant was selling its
unpatented salt at competitive prices, [citations], the rule adopted in International
Salt necessarily accepted the Government's submission that the earlier patent mis-
use cases supported the broader proposition "that this type of restraint is unlawful
on its face under the Sherman Act."
Id. (citations omitted).
186. Id. at 1289-90.
187. Id. at 1290-91 (referencing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (d) (5) (2000)).
188. Id. at 1291.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1291-92.
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there was no requirements tie in International Salt."9 1 Second, and
more significantly, the Court rejected Independent Ink's argument
that a patentee possesses market power when the purchase of the pat-
ented product is conditioned on buying the tied product exclusively
from the patentee.19 2
The Court recognized that the vast majority of academic litera-
ture agrees that patents do not necessarily confer market power. 93
Further, the Court reasoned that even though price discrimination
may be evidence of market power, price discrimination can also occur
in competitive markets.l19 4 Since neither of the factors standing alone
would give rise to a presumption of market power, the Court con-
cluded that neither should the combination of the factors.19 5 Lastly,
the Court buttressed its conclusion by pointing out that the antitrust
enforcement agencies reject a market power presumption. 19 6
Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, thereby eliminating the pat-
ent-equals-market-power presumption.1 9 7 On remand, Independent
Ink will be given an opportunity to show the market power element. 198
III. Analysis
A. While Superficially Appealing, the Court's Legal Reasoning for
Abandoning the Market Power Presumption Is
Misguided
1. The Supreme Court Focused on the Wrong Pool of Patents
The Supreme Court merely paid lip service to Independent Ink's
contention that, while the majority of patents may be valueless, pat-
ents used to enforce a tie are most often valuable.1'1 Citing the "vast
majority of academic literature," the Court stated that obtaining a pat-
ent does not necessarily result in market power.2z  There are two
problems with the Court's cursory dismissal of Independent Ink's ar-
gument that when focusing on the proper pool of patents-patents
191. Id. at 1292.
192. Id. at 1291-92.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1292.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1293.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Id. at 1291.
200. Id. at 1291 n.4, 1292.
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used to enforce a tying arrangement-there is a reasonable likelihood
that the patent confers sufficient market power. First, the Court relied
on the vast majority of academic literature but failed to examine the
qualifications to the contentions made in the literature. Second, since
the presumption urged is rebuttable, the question should not have
been whether a patent "necessarily confer[s] market power."20 1
Rather, the question should be whether patents used to enforce ties
tend to confer market power.
In its cursory dismissal of the first problem-mentioned only in a
footnote-the Court cited various academic commentators.2 0 2 How-
ever, the language cited from these sources does not support aban-
doning the presumption when the rationales of these statements are
examined. The Court cited the Hovenkamp IP and Antitrust treatise:
"[C]overage of one's prodcut [sic] with an intellectual property right
does not confer a monopoly."20 3 In the abstract, this statement is cor-
rect, but the question is whether a patent used in a tying arrangement
confers market power sufficient to enforce a tie, not "a monopoly."
Further, the same treatise admits, albeit grudgingly, that imposing a
burden on the patent tying defendant to go forward with evidence of
lack of market power is within "more credible bounds."20 4
The Court also cited Professor Phillip Areeda's treatise: "l[T] here
is no economic basis for inferring any amount of market power from
the mere fact that the defendant holds a valid patent."20 5 By relying on
this statement, the Court failed to address the argument in question;
instead, it addressed whether the broad pool of patents confers mar-
ket power. By the Court's own characterization of the argument, this
is not what Independent Ink asserted. 20 6 If the Court did examine the
appropriate pool of patents, the outcome would have been quite dif-
ferent. In a recent study, Professor Scherer found that litigation is the
most significant factor in determining the value and market power of
201. Id. at 1292.
202. See id. at 1291 n.4.
203. See id. (citing 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2a).
204. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2e2, at 4-24. See infra Part III.A.4, for a
discussion of the suggestion that a more appropriate focus for the Court would be an
examination of the strength of the presumption, rather than the polar extremes that the
Court decides between.
205. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291 n.4 (citing 10 AREEDA ET AL., A,,rITRUST LAW 1737a
(2d ed. 2004) (emphasis added)).
206. See id. at 1291; see Brief for Respondent at 21-23, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126
S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
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a patent.20 7 In his amicus brief in support of Independent Ink, Profes-
sor Scherer explained that the market power presumption is consis-
tent with this "litigation effect" since suits against harmful ties would
be brought by independent producers or consumers. 208 This is consis-
tent with focusing on whether the consumer was forced to buy some-
thing he or she otherwise would not have bought in a competitive
market so as to not discourage beneficial ties.
Justice Breyer's questioning of Petitioners and amici indicated his
concern regarding whether the Court examined the proper set of pat-
ents. 20 9 However, in the opinion, there is no mention of the amount
of market power, or lack of market power, that the relevant set of
patents confers. Rather, the Court's reasoning rested on the flawed
assumption that the relevant pool is all patents granted by the Patent
and Trademark Office, the majority of which are valueless.
Second, even if the Court focused on the relevant pool of patents,
the Court erroneously concluded that, because a patent did not "nec-
essarily" confer market power, no presumption was warranted.210 Pre-
sumptions are directed to evidentiary concerns and do not require
that the trigger of the presumption (existence of a patent) and the
presumed conclusion (existence of market power) be correlated in all
instances.21' The market power presumption is merely a burden-shift-
ing device supported by a 'judicial determination that it is reasonably
probable that the patent claims protect commercially useful subject
matter that is sufficiently distinctive or unique to persuade others to
pay a considerable risk premium above the cost of any substitutes on
the market."212 The Court neglected to inquire into the reasonable
probability of market power in patents used to enforce tying arrange-
ments. Further, the Court failed to explain why patents must necessa-
rily show market power to support the application of a presumption.
207. See Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at
6-8, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
208. See id. at 5-6.
209. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-8, 23-24, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126
S. Ct. 1281 (No. 04-1329).
210. Indep. Ink. 126 S. Ct. at 1292-93. In several instances, the Court stated that since a
patent did not "necessarily" confer market power, no presumption was warranted. Id.
211. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 79. It is worth noting the Court cited the Burchfiel
article in the footnote purporting to represent that the "vast majority" of academic litera-
ture agreed with the abandonment of the presumption. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291
n.4. While the Burchfiel article does outline the academic criticism of the market power
presumption, it argues that the presumption should remain in tact. See Burchfiel, supra
note 41, at 4 ("[T] he historical antitrust presumption of market power from patent owner-
ship retains its usefulness.").
212. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 79.
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Here, the market power presumption is merely a vehicle for effi-
ciently structuring the burden of proof.21 3 As discussed above, when
the inquiry is correctly focused on patents used to enforce a tying ar-
rangement, the patent holder is in the best position to explain the
arrangement and its alleged procompetitive aspects. Those critical of
the presumption fail to recognize that considerable evidentiary
problems will preclude many would-be tying plaintiffs from filing
suit.2 14
However, this argument applies generally to all antitrust offenses
where market power must be shown. There are at least two reasons
why market power proof should be structured differently in patent
tying antitrust offenses. First, there is an obvious, and significant, dis-
tinction between patent tying and regular tying: the nature of the ty-
ing product. The market power of the tying product depends on the
availability of substitutes. 21 5 To determine the availability of substitutes
in the general case, the court examines cross-elasticity of supply and
demand, entry barriers, and ease of arbitrage. 216 This alone presents
formidable proof problems.2 1 7 Full-blown market power analysis is
often cost prohibitive. Further, the plaintiff does not participate in the
tying market so difficulties in conducting the analysis are com-
pounded. Proof problems also hinder a plaintiff in a tying case when
determining the availability of substitutes in the market for licenses of
patented technology. This is because a patent is not limited merely to
its literal terms due to the doctrine of equivalents. 218 The doctrine of
equivalents is an extremely flexible and uncertain equitable doctrine
that allows a finding of infringement for close substitutes to the literal
terms of the patent.219 The presumption of market power in the pat-
ented tying product maintains a balance between patent holders and
competitors in the tied market-and correspondingly benefits the
public.220
213. See Brief for Respondent at 21, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281
(2006) (No. 04-1329).
214. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 3.
215. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.3.
216. See id. "Arbitrage" is the practice of buying a product in one market for a lower
price and selling it another market at a higher price. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 22,
at 9.
217. Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 3.
218. See id. at 4.
219. See generally CHisum, supra note 20.
220. See Merges, supra note 72, at 797 (arguing that patent misuse helps maintain the
"equitable symmetry" within patent law). Though Professor Merges' arguments are di-
rected to patent misuse, they apply to maintaining the presumption of market power. In
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Second, without a procompetitive justification, tying patented
products imposes the costs of patent law on another market. This may
stifle innovation in an entirely different market. This is inconsistent
with the goals of patent policy. The grant of a patent in one market
should generally not be used to stifle innovation in a separate market.
The patent right is intended to promote innovation in the market for
which the patent is granted.22'
2. The Supreme Court Does Not Reconcile Antitrust with the
Patent Misues Reform Act of 1988
The Supreme Court's decision finally made sense of the statutory
additions made by the House and Senate in enacting the Patent Mis-
use Reform Act of 1988. Since 1988, a showing of market power has
been required in the patent misuse context.222 Since the presumption
of market power originated in misuse, its elimination in misuse could
infer its elimination in antitrust tying. This reasoning was accepted by
the Court.223 After Independent Ink, market power is also required to
prove a per se tying violation in the antitrust context.224 However, in
order to accept this interpretation, the Court blinded itself to Con-
gress's explicit rejection of a provision eliminating the presumption in
the antitrust context.
While this decision makes antitrust jurisprudence logically consis-
tent with the Patent Misuse Reform Act, it ignores the fact that the
Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act (which was included by
the Senate) was deleted in the House of Representatives. 225 The Pat-
fact, the arguments apply with even more force since the patent misuse doctrine has been
largely reduced to antitrust doctrine. Like patent misuse, patent law and the presumption
of market power "should be seen as part of the larger fabric of patent law, designed to
ensure the integrity of the claims but also prevent them from becoming too powerful." Id.
at 797 n.5.
221. See discussion infra Part III.B.
222. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (5) (2000).
223. Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1291 (2006).
224. See generally id. However, there is debate as to whether the threshold market power
is the same for patent misuse and antitrust tying, as compared with showings of market
power in other antitrust violations. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 23-26.
225. Calkins, supra note 86, at 192-196. Calkins explained that Senate Bill 438
provided
first, that ownership of an intellectual property right-patent, copyright, or trade-
mark-shall not create a presumption of market power under the antitrust laws;
and, second, that a patent owner shall not be guilty of misuse or illegal extension
of a patent unless such practices or actions violate the antitrust laws.
Id. at 193 (citing S. 438, 100th Cong. (1988)). Only the second part was passed by the
House. Id. at 196-97.
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ent Misuse Reform Act only changed patent misuse law, not antitrust
law.2 26 Relying on the inconsistency created by the Patent Misuse Re-
form Act to abandon the presumption, the Court ignored an impor-
tant yet "absurd" (as the Court characterized it) compromise that the
House demanded. 227 The Court reasoned that since Congress re-
quired a showing of market power in the patent misuse context, Con-
gress also intended to abandon a well-settled presumption in the
antitrust context.228 This ignores the congressional compromise
clearly illustrated by the House's rejection of Senate Bill 438. Further,
subsequent legislation similar to the Intellectual Property Antitrust
Protection Act was rejected numerous times.229 This shows Congress's
intent to preserve the presumption in antitrust.
Any absurdity, as referred to by the court, shows that Congress
did not consider the competing interests at stake and the implications
of its decision. Rather, Congress hastily responded to the strong lobby
of the computer hardware and software industries. 230 While Con-
gress's action may have been absurd, when the competing interests
are examined, the Court's conclusion may be more absurd. This is
because abandonment of the antitrust presumption of market power
in patent tying arrangements is at odds with the underlying principles
of patent policy and the incentive theory of patent law. 23 1
3. The Supreme Court's Basis for Abandoning the Presumption
Rests on the Wrong Set of Tying Arrangement Cases
It is odd that the Supreme Court used standard tying analysis, in
which there was no intellectual property right associated with the ty-
226. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (4)-(5) (2000). See Feldman, supra note 15, at 423.
227. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
228. Id. at 1289-1291.
229. See H.R. 401, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 2674, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 298, 101st
Cong. (1990); S. 270, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 469, 101st Cong. (1989). All proposed a
similar form of the Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act.
230. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 21-22. Burchfiel explains Congress' limited consid-
erations of the repercussions of its decision:
One remarkable aspect of the legislative history is the anomaly that while Con-
gress acted based on a professed concern to allow software owners to sell tying
copyrighted programs with tied hardware, it amended the patent statute and
made no corresponding change in the copyright act. Indeed, there was little if
any consideration in Congress of the significant differences in the scope of pro-
tection offered by patents and copyrights, or of what a smoke signal from the pyre
of patent misuse would communicate to the judiciary in copyright misuse or anti-
trust cases.
Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
231. See infra Part III.B.
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ing product, to eliminate a presumption that was created to combat
the specific dangers of exploitation associated with tying arrange-
ments involving such a right.232 For example, the Court relied on the
imposition of more stringent market power requirements in Fortner II
and Jefferson Parish.233 Specifically, the Court viewed these cases as a
rejection of the "historical distrust of tying arrangements" and the as-
sumption that tying arrangements only harm competition.2 34 Neither
case involved patent tying. Significantly, the Jefferson Parish and Fortner
H courts both reaffirmed the market power presumption when the
tying product is patented.235
Further, it is unclear why the "vestige of the Court's historical dis-
trust of tying arrangements" as a whole is relevant to whether there is
justification for a rebuttable presumption of market power. The Court
interpreted the cases to show an evolution towards a stricter market
power requirement. This illustration does show a progression of the
Supreme Court's treatment of tying generally. However, any argu-
ment based on the evolution of tying arrangements generally must
make careful inquiry into the concerns of patent law since the pre-
sumption arose from patent law's policy of promoting innovation in
one market without stifling other innovation.
At oral argument, Justice Scalia asked counsel for Illinois Tool
Works whether it would be odd to treat patent tying differently than
regular tying.236 A separate analysis for patent tying cases would not be
"odd," as Justice Scalia's almost rhetorical question suggests, and may
in fact be necessary to prevent specific threats in tying arrangements
where there is an intellectual property right associated with the tying
product. The Court should have examined the "historical distrust" of
tying arrangements involving patents and the harms on competition
and innovation in the tied product market. Had this been done, the
Court would have ultimately found that the justification for the dis-
trust of patent tying is far from a vestige. While purporting to take a
"fresh examination" of patent tying, the Court incorrectly relied on
232. See Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. at 1291.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1288.
235. SeeJefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Former
Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 609, 619 (1977).
236. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct.
1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
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the trend in standard tying cases and neglected to examine the appro-
priate concerns specifically associated with patent tying. 237
4. Focusing on the Strength of the Presumption Would Better
Address the Supreme Court's Concerns About
Procompetitive Ties
At oral argument, Justice Breyer was concerned about the polariz-
ing effects of the Independent Ink decision, and he seemed to consider
only two options.238 He was concerned, on the one hand, that large
technology companies may be insulated from attack due to costs of
expensive economic analysis. 23 9 On the other handJustice Breyer was
also concerned that some technologies might not gain market accept-
ance without the use of a procompetitive discount tie.240 However, the
discussion focused on the polar extremes-employing a presumption
versus not employing a presumption-and neither discussion ad-
dressed a middle ground, which could afford a potential solution. The
strength of the presumption could address concerns voiced by both
Justice Breyer and the other members of the court.
The presumption is referred to very loosely in the Federal Circuit
decision 241 and academic commentary.2 42 Further, it is unclear what
was required to rebut the presumption when it existed. Professor
Hovenkamp suggests the presumption shifted the burden of proof.243
237. Part III.B makes the argument that courts should be wary of patent tying based on
patent policy.
238. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 45, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct.
1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
Federal Circuit stated:
"[T] he mere presence of competing substitutes for the tying product... is insuffi-
cient to destroy the legal, and indeed the economic, distinctiveness of the [pat-
ented] product." Rather, the definition of a market requires careful
consideration of both the product and geographic markets. The presumption can
only be rebutted by expert testimony or other credible economic evidence of the
cross-elasticity of demand, the area of effective competition, or other evidence of
lack of market power.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
242. Professor Hovenkamp seemed concerned that the presumption placed the bur-
den of persuasion on the issue of market power when he states: "The Federal Circuit's rule
appears to measure market power in a patent tie case by reference to the usual crite-
ia ... but with the all important difference that the burden of proof is shifted from the
plaintiff to the defendant." 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 4.2e9, at 4-45 (emphasis
added).
243. Id.
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However, according to the Federal Rules of Evidence, the presump-
tion shifted the burden of producing evidence of lack of market
power.244 Therefore, Professor Hovenkamp's alarming characteriza-
tion of the presumption as a shift in the burden of proof is largely
unfounded.
Instead of deciding between two extremes, the Court could have
addressed Justice Breyer's concerns by focusing on the evidentiary
threshold that the patent holder-antitrust defendant must meet in or-
der to overcome the presumption. The strength of the presumption
would determine the benefits and consequences of maintaining the
presumption. If properly constructed, the presumption of market
power can balance competing interests and effectuate patent policy
within an antitrust framework. Some commentators suggest that the
burden of establishing market power is onerous in intellectual prop-
erty cases because variable costs are very low and there are significant
fixed and sunk costs associated with the development or acquisition of
intellectual property.245 Even so, proof problems do not justify aban-
doning the presumption. In fact, that argument cuts more in favor of
retaining the presumption since the defendant will be in a much bet-
ter position to show whether or not market power exists. Given the
difficulties, shifting the burden slightly in the plaintiff's favor may be
the only way to facilitate the removal of marginally anticompetitive
ties.
Since traditional notions of variable, fixed, and sunk costs do not
apply well to intellectual property, the Court should focus on a less
economically-rigorous definition of market power. While Illinois Tool
Works claimed that it was impossible to prove a negative, 246 proving
lack of market power only requires showing the availability of reasona-
ble substitutes. The Federal Circuit stated that "the mere presence of
competing substitutes for the tying product ... is insufficient to de-
stroy" the presumption. 247 But perhaps evidence of competitors plus
something more would be enough, such as high acceptance rate of
the tie without a corresponding benefit to the buyers. For example, if
the tie is in fact procompetitive, the defendant should be able to rebut
the presumption by showing that there were competitors in the tying
market and that the buyers accepted the tying arrangement because a
244. See FED. R. EVID. 301.
245. See I HOVENKA-MP Er AL., supra note 13, § 4.2e9, at 4-45, 4-46.
246. See Brief for Petitioners at 32, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006)
(No. 04-1329).
247. Indep. Ink, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, 396 F.3d 1342, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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discount was given on the tying product as a method for spreading the
risk of a developing technology.2 48
In conclusion, Justice Breyer's concern-that technology compa-
nies may be insulated due to a cost-prohibitive economic analysis-
was overlooked. Instead of focusing narrowly on the strength of the
presumption and reconciling competing interests, the Court made a
choice between two polar extremes-presumption or no
presumption.
B. Inked Out: Policies the Court Neglected to Examine
Since the enactment of the Sherman Act, the patent-antitrust in-
tersection has been a source of constant debate. 249 The consensus is
that recent trends favor strengthening the patent grant and limiting
the applicability of antitrust. As patents have gained strength, impor-
tant constraints on the grant have been left behind. Without recogniz-
ing these constraints, patents may stifle innovation if societal costs
become greater than societal benefits. 250 The Court in Independent Ink,
while striving for consistency within antitrust doctrine, overlooked
countervailing policies and failed to analyze assumptions regarding
the consequences of its holding.
1. Abandoning the Presumption Blindly Replaces Patent Policy
with Antitrust Policy
The Independent Ink decision chips away at the policies of patent
law and favors a purely economic-driven theory based solely on anti-
trust principles. Antitrust law's concern with tying arrangements is
rooted in the patent misuse doctrine. 251 Originally, patent misuse was
directed to both anticompetitive effects and extensions of the patent
grant.252 Over time, patent misuse has borrowed from the antitrust
doctrine to the point where the two doctrines largely overlap. 253
The question becomes: what happened to patent law's concern
over the extension of the patent grant? Professor Feldman argues that
this harm justifies the continued existence of the patent misuse doc-
248. For a discussion of the procompetitive justification of tying used to spread risk
and gain market acceptance, see 1 HOVENKAMP ET A.., supra note 13, § 21.2f, at 21-16
through 21-17.
249. See generally Kaplow, supra note 12.
250. See id.
251. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 31-41.
252. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 402-03.
253. See 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 3.2c ("[P]atent misuse doctrine is largely
coexistive with antitrust doctrine.").
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trine. 254 However, the patent misuse doctrine currently has no bite
beyond what antitrust laws already provide. There are clear costs asso-
ciated with the patent system to which antitrust law is not sensitive.2 55
The rebuttable presumption of market power is an effective tool to
corral the societal costs of patent grants-both systemic costs and mar-
ginally anticompetitive costs which would otherwise escape detection.
The critics of the presumption characterize it as a "litigation tax"
that patent holders incur by virtue of owning patents. 25 6 This argu-
ment appears misdirected since there are many costs associated with
litigation that both sides incur. The argument cuts both ways-why
should consumers, who are forced to accept a tying arrangement,
have to pay a "litigation tax" in order to serve the public good and
remove the restraint of trade?
This litigation tax argument also overlooks the requirement that
only patent holders who use tying to exact their reward will be subject
to the "tax." Maintaining the presumption of market power serves
mostly as notice to patent holders that society is suspicious of using a
government-granted right in a manner to exclude rivals from secon-
dary markets. It does not follow from a rebuttable presumption of
market power that all patent tying arrangements are harmful to com-
petition and innovation. Ties are harmful when they force the con-
sumer "to do something that he would not do in a competitive
market. '25 7 Accordingly, if tying is imposed, the seller must be pre-
pared to show why it was procompetitive and good for consumers.
In any case, critics argue the presumption is "effectively a penalty"
and will "disincentivize" innovators from innovating. 258 This view of
the incentive theory makes a fatal assumption. Such an assumption
"represents a highly unlikely and unorthodox view of the incentives
created by the patent system and implies counterfactually that most
patent owners engage in tying conduct."259 Nothing suggests that all
or most inv7entors rely on the ability to exact returns from a tied mar-
ket when deciding to innovate. In its purest form, nothing in the in-
254. See Feldman, supra note 15, at 423.
255. See id.
256. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Ili. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct.
1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
257. Eastman Kodak Co. v. image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (citingJeffer-
son Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)).
258. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago in
Support of Petitioner at 11, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-
1329).
259. Brief of Amici Curiae American Antitrust Institute et al. in Support of Respondent
at 25, Ill. Tool Works v. Indep. Ink, 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
Fall 2006]
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW. REVIEW
centive theory justification for patent law contemplates allowing
inventors to exploit the grants from a patent in a wholly separate, tied
market. However, it seems consistent with patent policy to allow the
practice if tying is the only way to incentivize innovation in the tying
product market. By the same token, patent policies would be offended
if a tying arrangement-enforced with the power granted from a pat-
ent-harms innovation in another market. It seems unlikely that put-
ting a small speed bump in front of patent holders will have a
significant effect on the incentives of inventors. The rebuttable pre-
sumption serves to strike a balance, providing the appropriate incen-
tive to innovate and protecting innovation in secondary markets.
2. Leverage or Not, Societal Harm Depends on the Manner in
Which the Government-Granted Right to Exclude Is
Exploited
The debate over whether leverage is possible has been waged for
years.260 If, as the Chicago School asserts, the monopolist has but one
monopoly profit to extract, and since the monopolist can extract from
one or more markets through a tying arrangement, the patent and
antitrust laws should favor extraction from one market. Professor
Kaplow analogizes use of market power to use of a stick of dyna-
mite.261 If a terrorist has one stick of dynamite, it matters greatly
where and how that dynamite is used. 262 That is, harm to societal wel-
fare is affected depending on how market power is exploited. 263 How
the power conferred by a patent is employed and in what market it is
used is of even greater concern than use of market power generally. A
patent is granted for an invention to incentivize people to make inven-
tions, but the grant is not without costs. The patent right granted by
the government is artificial, and it represents the tradeoff whereby the
societal benefits must be sufficient to compensate for the societal loss.
When the tying arrangement involves a patented tying product rather
than a standard tying product, the systemic costs associated with the
patent grant are imposed on secondary markets. Therefore, it is bene-
260. This Note does not attempt to point out general criticisms of price theory and the
assumptions that the Chicago School's antitrust analysis rests on. For a summary and gen-
eral outline of the Chicago School underpinnings, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago
School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979). For a response to the Chicago
School's reliance on price theory to explain why leverage cannot occur, see Louis Kaplow,
Extensions of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 515 (1985).
261. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 516.
262. See id.
263. See id.
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ficial to at least attempt to corral the patent right to the market for
which it was granted.
The law should be cautious of ties that may cause a patent in the
tying product market to trump another's innovation in the tied prod-
uct market. The rebuttable presumption of market power embodies
this concern. By minimally disfavoring patent tying arrangements, the
presumption keeps the societal costs associated with the patent re-
stricted to the market for which the patent was granted when possible.
It is worth noting that the presumption only favors extraction of pat-
ent rewards from the tying market and does not preclude procompeti-
tive ties.
The problem with the Chicago School attack264 on leveraging the
patent grant is that the focus is solely on price, to the exclusion of
other factors that affect innovation and competition. 265 There is a de-
veloping body of economic work that uses dynamic, long-run models
and suggests that tying can foreclose innovation in the tied market.2 66
As a result, the only thing commentators can say for certain is that the
dynamic effects of leverage and tying are unknown. Due to the lack of
evidence of the dynamic effect on innovation and market structure,
patent policy should favor competition and innovation in the tied
product market. In short, direct exploitation of this artificial grant im-
poses lower costs than indirect exploitation.267
Critics argue that there are many procompetitive justifications for
tying.2 68 This Note does not attempt to endorse or refute these justifi-
cations. It argues only that, when a patent holder engages in tying, he
or she should be certain that the tying arrangement is in fact procom-
petitive and beneficial to consumers. For example, a tying arrange-
264. The Chicago School's price theory attack assumes that the monopolist has one
monopoly profit to extract and can do so in one or more markets but cannot extract more
than one monopoly profit. See Posner, supra note 260, at 926.
265. See Kaplow, supra note 12, at 527-31. The Chicago School does not look at the
long-run effects on competition, entry barriers, strategic positioning, and other changes in
firms' costs. Id. at 530.
266. See generally Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002); Jay Pil
Choi & Christodulos Stefanadis, Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theoy, 32 RAND
J. ECON. 52 (2001); Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON.
Rv. 837 (1990); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an Entry Barrier, 119 Q. J. ECON. 159 (2004).
These models and the assumptions they rely on are beyond the scope of this Note and
do not necessarily apply directly to the facts of Independent Ink. The important point these
"Post-Chicago" economists make is that dynamic models show the effects of tying and possi-
ble harm to competition and innovation in the tied product market.
267. See Kaplow, supra note 12.
268. See, e.g., 1 HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 13, § 21.2f, at 21-16, 21-17.
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ment might be procompetitive if the tying product is a new
technology, sold at a reduced price to break into the market, and the
price reduction is recouped in sales of the tied product. In that case,
there is possible upside, such as availability of new technology to con-
sumers, to balance the unknown effects of tying arrangements in a
dynamic market. Presumably, the patent holder would be able to show
that the tying arrangement was procompetitive or that it lacked mar-
ket power.
Justice White's reaction in his A.B. Dick dissent correctly articu-
lated concerns about patent tying.269 Given the strong lobby power of
intellectual property owners who wish to strengthen their rights on all
fronts, the courts should be concerned that the patent grant may be
too strong.270 With unknown long-run effects, patent tying might stifle
innovation and competition on the merits in another market. The
presumption mitigates this concern and alleviates the collective action
problem faced by consumers and independent manufacturers in sec-
ondary markets. Before Independent Ink, the law at least was concerned
about harm resulting from using a patent right in a secondary market
even when market power is not proven by the plaintiff. In absence of
the presumption, these concerns are overlooked.
IV. Conclusion: Patent Tying After Independent Ink
On a micro level, the practical consequences for antitrust plain-
tiffs will be minimal, though at the margins, the lack of a market
power presumption will significantly exacerbate the public good prob-
lem. Even with a market power presumption, most plaintiffs went to
trial armed with market power evidence anticipating that the defen-
dant would attempt to rebut the presumption.2 71 In short, no antitrust
269. See supra Part II.D.
270. See Burchfiel, supra note 41, at 21-22. Burchfiel explains how the strong computer
industry lobby successfully lobbied Congress for an exemption from patent misuse:
The patent misuse tying amendment proceeded neither directly from concern
related to patent misuse, nor from ties of patents to staples. Instead, it was engen-
dered by the desire of computer manufacturers to tie sales of computer hardware
to copyrighted operating system software. Statutory immunity was sought prima-
rily due to the fears of antitrust liability on the part of computer manufacturers
employing such tying arrangements.
Id.
271. Professor Eugene Crew, Lecture in Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the Uni-
versity of San Francisco School of Law (Feb. 2, 2006).
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plaintiff2 72 would bring a tying claim without being prepared to show
evidence of market power.
Further, Eastman Kodak makes it clear that exercise of market
power is sufficient evidence that the defendant actually had market
power. 273 Market power may be shown by direct evidence such as in-
creased price or restricted output.2 7 4 Eastman Kodak stated: "It is
clearly reasonable to infer [that the defendant has] market power to
raise prices . . .[by presenting] direct evidence that [the defendant]
did so."27- For most harmful ties, where the plaintiff does not want the
tied product on the terms offered, the plaintiff will be able to show
market power based on the successful exercise of market power as
articulated in Eastman Kodak.
On a macro level, abandoning the market power presumption
represents the larger trend of equating patent and antitrust policies in
a one-to-one fashion. This abandonment also illustrates the trend of
overlooking the internal constraints of patent law, such as the patent
misuse doctrine. On the one hand, equating patent misuse and anti-
trust doctrines is desirable for consistency since misuse is criticized as
being too uncertain. On the other hand, antitrust law is by no means
certain, but it is an extensively-developed doctrine. Clearly, there are
some policies of patent law that antitrust law does not capture. A pre-
sumption of market power in scenarios where the patent in question
is likely to be highly valuable is an effective proxy for the internal con-
straints of patent law. If there is a procompetitive reason for the tie,
then the defendant simply must come forward with evidence disprov-
ing market power. This is an efficient procedure to structure proof in
a fair and organized fashion.
After Independent Ink, patent holders have the green light for tying
arrangements to the extent that they are effectively insulated from at-
tack by the difficulties and costs plaintiffs face without the presump-
tion.276 Elimination of the presumption creates one more hurdle that
consumers and small independent manufacturers in secondary mar-
kets will have to jump over before the restraints on trade and innova-
tion can be remedied. Further, in light of the well-organized lobby for
intellectual property owners and the disaggregated consumers and in-
272. This precise issue only appears in rare instances, such as in Independent Ink, where
there was complete reliance on the presumption. This is because, even before Independent
Ink, most antitrust plaintiffs were prepared to offer at least some evidence of market power.
273. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
274. See id.
275. Id. at 477.
276. See McLaughlin, supra note 104.
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dependent manufacturers, it is unlikely that Congress will curb the
increasing rewards granted with patents. The shift to pure economic
considerations, void of patent policy considerations, shows the Court
is headed in the same direction.
